Intension and Extension, Part 2

The 'intension' of any idea consists in the qualities or properties that are the substance[1] of the idea. See the first part in this series. For example, the Constitution, Article. I.Section. 1. states that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Taken in its entirety, the 'substance' of the Section is legislative powers, and what they shall be vested in.

Any 'extension' of an idea is dependent on the 'intension' for its substance. Section 2. states, "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States," and in the substance of that there is no 'extension' of any idea that those elected cannot be women or blacks--nor, for that matter, Catholics or Muslims or "Hindoos", as Thomas Jefferson spelled it.

So for all practical purposes, 'intension' is the same as someone's 'intentions'; it merely has a semantic difference in the way philosophers of law use the word. The intension is necessarily in the words and syntax, if you are a textualist (also called a constructionist, from the 'construction' of the clauses and sentences.)

If you are an originalist, the intension is more likely to be in the meaning of those words and that syntax as they were meant when the text was written. That is called original expected application. If on the other hand you are of the belief that the intension should be based on what reasonable persons living at the time of its adoption would have said was the meaning, that is called original public meaning. The problem between these forms of originalism is that the writers of the Constitution, and those who took part in the debates, wrote extensively both before and after it was written. If you read what they wrote and you abide by what they wrote, you might be adopting original application, or you might be following the original public meaning. Reasonable persons living at the time were very well versed in what their intellectuals had to say. And many of those intellectuals said the intension was in the text, so that textualism and both forms of originalism melt into one when we try to interpret the Constitution.

"Originalism tends to favor a narrower definition of civil liberties than modernism does, so it generally permits more authoritarian laws," states a popular website. Obviously this is wrong, because the entire purpose of the Constitution was the promotion of the 'general Welfare' without infringing upon what all 'reasonable persons at the time' believed was the individual sovereignty of the individual. But it may be a common belief because since the time of at least the New Deal, Americans have been taught by their leaders that our Constitution was meant to guarantee 'positive' rights, that is grants, the creation of what does not exist under natural law; in other words, entitlements, not just of money, but of 'social justice'.

The belief in individual sovereignty was not a 'peculiar conceit' of Thomas Jefferson; rather, it was "the common assumption of the day." Jefferson himself has often been described as a strict constructionist, yet his thoughts on the proposed and real extensions of his time are used by originalists of both types, and by textualists.

It is true that individual sovereignty was commonly acknowledged. Sam Adams wrote that he feared misinterpretation of the Constitution would grow the power of the Federal government at the expense of the States and "sink both in despotism." "Those Virginians, such as Patrick Henry and George Mason," wrote Dr. Roger M. Firestone, "who argued most strongly for the Bill of Rights, knew that the individual would require defenses against the authority of the state."

Positive rights are extensions of the Constitution if you interpret it as a 'living document', meant to be read in the context of a modern world. Even then, you must ignore what those who lived during that period knew was the intent of the Framers--because the Framers told them their intent.

The only 'modern' part of the extensions since the New Deal (and some before that) is the loss of individualism in favor of authoritarianism, not the reverse as the quote above states.
 
[1] that by virtue of which a thing has its determinate nature source


© Curtis Edward Clark 2012
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The Extension and Intension of the Constitution

We must begin this discussion with the definition of the words in the title:
"The intension of a concept consists of the qualities or properties which go to make up the concept. The extension of a concept consists of the things which fall under the concept; or, according to another definition, the extension of a concept consists of the concepts which are subsumed under it (determine subclasses)" source 

The intension of the Constitution is, therefore, the qualities or properties which go to make up the concept. What is the concept? It is supremely simple, and in two parts: the first quality is that of a government more able to deal with national problems than the Articles of Confederation allowed for; and the second property was to make a government less able to violate the rights of minorities. The second quality was the biggest intensional concern of James Madison, Patrick Henry and others, and it is the one that has seen its extensions go awry, since the era of the New Deal.

The extensional parts are the subclasses of the intensions; they are the things which 'fall under' the concept(s). Article 1, Section 2 explaining the composition of the Congress, is therefore an extension of Section 1, explaining that there shall be a Senate and a House.

"The Constitution does not give you rights," explains the Constitutionality Crisis. "The founders considered your rights to be 'God-given' or 'natural rights' — you are born with all your rights. The constitution does, however, protect your rights by:

• Limiting the powers of government by granting to it only those specific powers that are listed in the Constitution; (This has not proven to be effective of late.)
• Enumerating certain, specific rights which you retain. These are listed in the Bill of Rights." [emphasis in original]

The Constitution, in turn, is an extension of John Locke's famous intensional statement about the state of nature specifically, that it "has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. [John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, §6] [emphasis in original]

But more than that, our coveted Bill of Rights are the extensions of the entire concept for the limitation of the powers of government, and the empowerment of the individual. "The whole of the Bill is a declaration of the right of the people at large or considered as individuals…It establishes some rights of the individual as unalienable and which consequently, no majority has the right to deprive them of." –Albert Gallatin, 1789, New York Historical Society

The original statements of the Founders give us their intent for ratifying the words they used. Why did they say this, and say it that way instead of the other way or another way? But epistemological intension is like a definition of a genus, whereas extension is like the definition of a species. The genus of the Constitution is that of a document never seen before then, one that had two part, the way 'man' is defined as 'rational animal'. The two parts are to be an enabler of individualism, and a limiter of government.

Madison warned us of wrongful extensions of the limited powers given to government, and named many that we see today. Congress might, he said, "establish teachers in every state, county, and parish, and pay them out of the public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the union, they may assume the provision for the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post roads; in short, every thing from the highest object of state legislation, down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress [ ] and might be called, if Congress pleased, provisions for the general welfare."

These things are so commonplace that we do not even think about some of them as being usurpations by the nation upon the powers of the States; or worse, usurpations on your individual sovereignty, which was a commonly held extension of the purpose of the limitation on government.

Next Friday I will examine some others in detail.

© Curtis Edward Clark 2012

States' Rights and The 'Slow Rot' Principle

     Has the Ninth Amendment had little effect in the courts? It has certainly not had the power of a 'rule of construction', as James Madison said it was.
     The enlargement of federal powers in the previous century were able to be accomplished because the Tenth Amendment "does not prevent expansive interpretations of enumerated federal powers...render[ing] meaningless
the Tenth's reservation of powers to the states "[1]

     "Thus statism was to come," wrote Ayn Rand, "not by vote or by violence, but by slow rot—by a long process of evasion and epistemological corruption..."

     Critics of the loss of the federalism model claim the Tenth Amendment merely says the States retain all powers not ceded to the Federal government; and because of Rand's "slow rot" principle, those 'expansive interpretations'. Very recently discovered historical documentation show that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were intended to work together so that "the Ninth prohibited interpretations of enumerated power that disparaged those states’ rights."[2]
     Well, how was this connection between the two Amendments supposed to work? (And why has this scholarship been ignored until now?) States that had demanded the relationship, like Virginia, held up ratification of the Bill of Rights for two years because they didn't think the Ninth was adequate to the job. But James Madison convinced them it was, in a speech to Congress opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791).
     "Madison's draft of the Ninth Amendment," wrote Kurt T. Lash in this new documentation called The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, "contained a rule of interpretation expressly limiting the constructive enlargement of federal power." Madison himself is said to have expressly stated that the altered version found in the Bill. "Madison's speech removed any ambiguity regarding his understanding of the Ninth Amendment, and the Virginia Assembly was entitled to rely on Madison's description of the Ninth when, only a few months later, it ratified the Bill of Rights."[1]
     Originalism pertains to the historical documents left behind by the Founders as to what they perceived to be the meaning of their words. See March 8 TPO Because it was Madison who wrote the original wording of the Ninth Amendment, and then convinced other Founders of its meaning, upon which they then ratified the Bill, it is Madison's words we must take into account.
     There is a world of difference between "original meaning" and "original intent". I will discuss that in the next blog.

     



[1] Texas Law Review [Vol. 83:331] 336
[2] Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review

© Curtis Edward Clark 2011
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